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M v. H: TIME TO
CLEAN UP YOUR ACTS
Brenda Cossman and Bruce Ryder
In the 1990s, the Supreme Court of Canada twice
found ways to avoid dealing with the implications of
anti-discrimination law for the rights of gay and lesbian
couples. In Mossop,' a majority of the Court fashioned a
ruling that amounted to a postponement of an
engagement with the question of whether the law
requires the recognition of gay family status. In Egan2 a
5-4 majority of the Court bought legislatures some
additional time to come to grips with the "novel
concept"3 of conferring equality rights on same-sex
couples. No doubt one reason for the Court's
equivocation was the large gap that existed between the
logical requirements of equality principles and the
exclusion of gay and lesbian couples from a multitude of
laws dealing with the rights and responsibilities of
family members. By 1999, a pattern offavourable rulings
from lower courts and administrative tribunals, 4 changes
in the membership of the Court,5 and a steady increase in
public support for the recognition of the rights of gay
and lesbian couples, combined to create the conditions
in which the Court was emboldened to start closing the
gap between constitutional promise and legislative
reality. In Mv. H,6 the essence of the message the Court
sent to legislators was: time to clean up your Acts.
Mossop v. A.-G. Canada, [19931 1 S.C.R. 554 [hereinafter
Mossop].
Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 [hereinafter Egan].
Ibid., per Sopinka J. at 576.
The case law is thoroughly reviewed in Kathleen A. Lahey, Are
We 'Persons' Yet? Law and Sexuality in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1999) at 78-92.
Justice Sopinka's death in 1997, and Justice La Forest's
retirement in the same year, deprived the Court of two members
of the 5-4 majority who had voted to dismiss the Charter claim
in Egan, supra note 2.
[1999] S.C.J. No. 23 (QL), (1999), 171 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [cited
to S.C.J.].
THE MAJORITY'S RULING
By an 8-1 majority, the Court held in Mv. H that
section 29 of the Ontario Family Law Act7 discriminated
on the basis of sexual orientation by excluding lesbians
and gay men from the right to seek spousal support from
a same-sex partner with whom they have cohabited.
Applying the framework for section 15 equality analysis
that a unanimous Court had elaborated earlier this year
in Law v. Canada,8 the principal majority judgment of
Cory and Iacobucci JJ.9 found that section 29 of the Act
violates the human dignity of lesbian and gay couples by
promoting the view that they are "less worthy of
recognition and protection" and "incapable of forming
intimate relationships of economic interdependence as
compared to opposite-sex couples . . . ." Moreover, "it
perpetuates the disadvantages suffered by individuals in
same-sex relationships and contributes to the erasure of
their existence. °10
In the section 1 analysis, the majority held that the
exclusion was not rationally related to the objectives
underlying the spousal support provisions in Part III of
the Family Law Act, which they characterized as dealing
equitably with the economic needs of persons in
interdependent relationships and the alleviation of claims
on the public purse by privatizing the costs of family
breakdown." The majority concluded that the
appropriate remedy was to declare section 29 of the Act
to be of no force and effect, with a suspension of the
operation of the declaration of invalidity for six months
R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3.
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497.
Cory J. wrote the s. 15 portion of the analysis, and lacobucci J.
dealt with the s.1 and remedial issues. Lamer C.J. and
L'Heureux-DubW, McLachlin and Binnie JJ. concurred with
their joint judgment. Major J. and Bastarache J. each wrote
separate concurring judgments. Gonthier J. dissented.
0 Mv. H, supra note 6 at para. 73.
Ibid. at para. 93.
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to enable the legislature to consider ways of bringing this
provision, and other laws, into conformity with the
equality rights in the Charter.2
AVOIDING CHARGES OF "JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM"
It is clear from the language of the decision that
members of the Court were anxious to minimize the kind
of controversy about judicial power ignited by the
Court's earlier gay rights ruling in Vriend v. Alberta 3
and the ensuing trumped-up accusations of judicial
activism emanating from the United Alternative, the
Alberta Report, the National Post and other increasingly
desperate voices of the waning forces of Canadian moral
conservatism. The Court's caution was evident in the
repeated emphasis it placed on the fact that the only
issue before it was the constitutionality of section 29 of
the Family Law Act, a provision which applies only to
unmarried heterosexual couples. Justice Cory began his
section 15 analysis by stating ". . . it must be stressed
that the questions to be answered are narrow and precise
in their scope;"' 4 the appeal had nothing to do with the
definition of marriage, nor with the bundle of rights and
responsibilities that attach to married persons, nor with
other laws that excluded same-sex couples from common
law definitions of spouse.'5 Justice lacobucci similarly
emphasized that the ruling "does not challenge
traditional conceptions of marriage"' and that laws other
than the one at issue in a particular challenge must be
evaluated individually by reference to their unique
objectives and context. 7
The Court's sensitivity to charges of judicial
activism was also evident in its avoidance of the
"reading in" remedy that had proven so controversial
after the Court added the words "sexual orientation" to
the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination in
Alberta human rights legislation in Vriend. The reasons
lacobucci J. gave for declining to read same-sex couples
into section 29, which was the remedy adopted by the
Ontario Court of Appeal, were not particularly
convincing.
He argued that if members of same-sex couples
were read into the definition of spouse in section 29 of
the Act, they could be subject to spousal support
obligations without being able to opt out by entering a
domestic contract under Part IV of the Act.'" Common
law couples can opt out of their statutory support
obligations by signing cohabitation and separation
agreements pursuant to sections 53 and 54 respectively.
These provisions are expressly limited to contracts
signed by "a man and a woman." However, the courts
now recognize the enforceability of cohabitation
contracts at common law, and it is highly unlikely that
the terms of an agreement entered into by a same-sex
couple would be ignored in considering a spousal
support claim under Part III of the Act. Justice Iacobucci
was also concerned that reading in is an inappropriate
remedy when it would "have significant repercussions
for a separate and distinct" part of an Act, in this case the
dependants' tort claim in Part V, which incorporates the
definition of spouse in section 29."9 Why the majority
could not have limited the application of its order to Part
III of the Act was not explained.
The concerns lacobucci J. raised about the reading
in remedy seem modest and easily avoided, especially
when considered in light of the deficiencies of the
remedy he did adopt. By declaring section 29 invalid if
it is not rectified within six months, the Court has
created a situation where the right to claim spousal
support will be limited to married couples as of
November 20, 1999 if the Ontario government does not
pass amending legislation. Such a situation would
discriminate on the basis of marital status, as the Alberta
Court of Appeal recently held.2" The remedy lacobucci
J. chose thus violates his own warning that courts should
not "remedy one constitutional wrong only to create
another, and thereby fail to ensure the validity of the
legislation."'"
Ibid. at paras. 145-47.
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 [hereinafter Vriend].
M v. H, supra note 6 at para. 7.
Ibid. at paras. 52 and 55.
Ibid. at para. 134.
Ibid. at para. 75.
Ibid. at para. 141.
'9 Ibid. at para. 142.
o Taylor v. Rossu (1998), 161 D.L.R. (4th) 266 (Alta. C.A.). Bill
12, the Domestic Relations Amendment Act, 1999, responded
to the Taylor ruling by conferring spousal support rights and
obligations on unmarried heterosexual couples. The Bill did not
rectify the exclusion of same-sex couples. The amendment
received Royal Assent on May 19, 1999, not coincidentally the
day before the release of Mv. H. It is now clear that the Alberta
legislature remedied one constitutional wrong only to create
another.
2 Mv. H, supra note 6 at para. 141.
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TOSSING THE ISSUE TO THE
LEGISLATURE
Unlike the reading in remedy, the suspended
declaration of invalidity does have the important
advantage of tossing the issue on to the legislative
agenda where it ought to have been addressed in the first
place. Clearly the majority was in no mood to give
Ontario legislators further reasons for doing nothing,
heaping the entire burden of law reform in this area on
litigants and the courts, and thus continuing to invite the
judicial activism they purport to abhor. Indeed, despite
the fact that the Court was deciding the narrow issue of
the constitutionality of one law, in truth the many other
statutes containing spousal definitions that exclude
same-sex couples raise constitutional issues that differ
little from the issues addressed in M v. H. Justice
Iacobucci acknowledged this when he closed his analysis
of the remedial issue by noting that:
... declaring section 29 of the FLA to be of no
force and effect may well affect numerous
other statutes that rely upon a similar definition
of the term 'spouse.' The legislature may wish
to address the validity of these statutes in light
of the unconstitutionality of section 29 of the
FLA. On this point, I agree with the majority of
the Court of Appeal which noted that if left up
to the courts, these issues could only be
resolved on a case-by-case basis at great cost to
private litigants and the public purse. Thus, I
believe the legislature ought to be given some
latitude in order to address these issues in a
more comprehensive fashion.
Gwen Landolt of REAL Women missed the mark in
inimitable fashion when she alleged that the Court has
"opened the gates to the pack-dogs to attack the
traditional family."22 Justice L'Heureux-Dubd succinctly
dismissed this kind of paranoid familial fundamentalism
with her remark in Mossop that "[i]t is not anti-family to
support protection for non-traditional families. The
traditional family is not the only family form, and
non-traditional family forms may equally advance true
family values."23 Yet it is true that the Court has signaled
to legislatures that there are broad implications to its
ruling in Mv. H. It has directed legislatures to examine
all statutes with similar spousal definitions, and told
them to "address these issues in a more comprehensive
fashion." And ironically, it has done so in a judgment
22 Quoted in Carmen Wittmeier, "Playing House: Politicians
cower as the Supreme Court overrides the natural family order"
Alberta Report (31 May 1999) 20 at 21.
23 Supra note I at 634.
otherwise couched in the language of judicial
deference.24 Below the political packaging, however, the
legal ramifications are broad. The Court has recognized
the limitations of the judiciary in addressing these issues
- the courts can proceed only on a case by case basis,
deciding the narrow issue of law before them.
Responsibility for bringing legislation into conformity
with constitutional norms lies more appropriately with
the legislatures who can address the issues in a
comprehensive fashion. But, the underlying message is
also clear - having failed to deliver earlier when the
courts bought them time, the legislatures must now clean
up their Acts. If they do not, then the courts will, at no
small expense to all involved.
Immediately after M v. H was released, Premier
Harris indicated that he would "comply" with the ruling
and would not seek to invoke the notwithstanding clause
of the Charter to preserve the legislative status quo.25
Other governments - with the exception of Alberta,
which is keeping its options open - made similar
statements. But what exactly does complying with the
ruling mean?
LEGISLATIVE IMPLICATIONS
(i) Section 29 of the Family Law Act
First, there is the narrow question of the
implications of the ruling for spousal support under the
Ontario Family Law Act. If the Ontario government fails
to act within the six month period, the result will be that
all unmarried couples - same-sex and opposite sex -
will be excluded from the spousal support provisions in
Part III of the Act. Given the increasing emphasis on
privatizing support obligations, this is unlikely to be an
attractive option for a government committed to fiscal
conservatism. However, revising a definition of spouse
to include same-sex couples is also unlikely to be an
attractive option for a morally conservative government
that has made it clear that bringing legislative definitions
of family into conformity with its constitutional
responsibilities is not a priority.26
Given this conservative dilemma, the Ontario
government may adopt a minimalist approach - fix as
little as possible. Such an approach would amend section
24 See for example Justice Iacobucci's comments on judicial
deference, supra note 6 at paras 78-81.
25 Quoted in Kirk Makin, "Gay couples win rights" Globe and
Mail (21 May 1999) A1.
26 "It's not my priority. It's not my definition of family but it is
others' . , . ." Premier Mike Harris quoted in Tonda
MacCharles and Tracey Tyler, "Same-sex ruling to rewrite
many laws" Toronto Star (21 May 1999) Al.
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29 to include same-sex couples, as well as sections 53
and 54 to make explicit their ability to opt out of the
support scheme through' domestic contracts. The
government would also need to consider the implications
for Part V of the Act dealing with the dependants' tort
claim for damages. Unfortunately, the six month time
period for reform, unless it is extended by the Court,
creates pressure towards a minimalist approach and a
truncated legislative process involving little or no
consultation with the gay and lesbian communities most
affected by any amendments. Not only did the six month
clock start running in the middle of an election
campaign, but it also ran over the summer break, when
the new legislature was not yet sitting.
In undertaking any reforms, the legislature will not
be assisted by the majority's failure to clarify the
meaning of the term "conjugal" and its relationship to
the objectives underlying the legislative scheme. The
word "conjugal" plays a central role in dividing
"spouses" from other people living together. The
extended definition of spouse in section 29 requires a
couple to have cohabited. "Cohabit" is'defined in section
1(1) of the Act as "to live together in a conjugal
relationship." Conjugal is not defined, except in some
rather anachronistic case law that Cory J. simply cited
with approval.27 All the majority judgment told us is that
same-sex couples are capable of meeting the conjugality
requirement. If section 29 is revised to include same-sex
couples, then they too will be governed by the outdated,
intrusive and vague common law test of conjugality -
a test that is poorly related to the majority's
characterization of the objectives of the legislation and
one that comes perilously close to a 'I know it when I see
it' definition.2"
27 Justice Cory cited Molodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 17 R.F.L.
(2d) 376 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) as setting out ". . . the generally
accepted characteristics of a conjugal relationship. They
include shared shelter, sexual and personal behavior, services,
social activities, economic support and children, as well as the
societal perception of the couple." Mv. H, supra note 6 at para.
59. He agreed with the lower court that these dimensions of
family life will be present in varying degrees, and that it will
not be necessary for a couple to satisfy all of these dimensions
for their relationship to be conjugal: "neither opposite sex
couples nor same-sex couples are required to fit precisely the
traditional marital model to demonstrate that the relationship is
'conjugal'." Ibid. Justice Cory stated that the approach to
determining whether a relationship is conjugal must be
"flexible," since the "relationships of all couples will vary
widely." Ibid. at para. 60. In other words, he provided virtually
no guidance on how conjugality should be defined or applied.
28 For a discussion of the problems with the notion of conjugality,
see Brenda Cossman and Bruce Ryder, Gay, Lesbian and
Unmarried Heterosexual Couples and the Family Law Act:
Accommodatinga DiversityofFamilyForms (Toronto: OLRC,
1993) at 77-83.
(ii) All legislative definitions of common
law spouse
The most obvious problem with the minimalist
approach to reform is that it ignores the clear
implications of M v. H for all common law spousal
definitions, at both the provincial and federal levels. The
Court, as it emphasized, was not addressing the
constitutionality of all common law spousal decisions.
However, the message in lacobucci J.'s concluding
words that the ruling on section 29 "may well affect
numerous other statutes that rely upon a similar
definition of the term 'spouse"' is not subtle. All of these
definitions are now vulnerable to constitutional
challenge. If left to the courts, these definitions are likely
to fall, case by case.
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that
lacobucci J. clearlyrejected the view that "government
incrementalism" ("the notion that government ought to
be accorded time to amend discriminatory legislation")
can provide the basis for a section 1 justification.29 This
reasoning had been central to Sopinka J.'s swing
judgment dismissing the challenge to the exclusion of
same-sex couples from eligibility for an old age spousal
allowance in Egan. The Court in Mv. H, however, did
not explicitly overrule Egan. Instead, it emphasized that,
unlike the claim in Egan which sought an extension of
public funding, the claim in Mv. H advanced the goals
of fiscal conservatism by reducing claims on the public
purse. Thus, a window has been left open to
governments to argue that they are only obliged to
extend equal rights to same-sex couples if it does not
cost them anything. Mv. H does ring the death knell for
Egan's moral conservatism, but it leaves Egan's fiscal
conservatism intact. While that fiscal conservatism has
been eroded by recent decisions, including those that
have extended pension benefits to the surviving members
of same-sex couples, it still haunts equality jurisprudence
in this and other areas.
At the very least, a government committed to
following the implications of the Supreme Court ruling
in this case, and avoiding unnecessary and expensive
litigation, should undertake a serious examination and
revision of all common law spousal definitions contained
in its statutes. Passing amendments to include same-sex
couples in statutes that apply to unmarried heterosexual
couples was the approach adopted earlier this year in
Quebec, 0 that was defeated on a free vote on Ontario's
Bill 167 in 1994, that B.C. has embarked upon at least in
19 MV. H, supra note 6 at para. 128.
30 Loi modifiant diverses dispositions l~gislatives concernant les
conjoints defait, S.Q. 1999, c. 14.
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part,3' and that the federal government is currently
contemplating in response to M v. H and an omnibus
challenge to federal statutes launched by the Foundation
for Equal Families.32
(iii) Spousal Rights of Married Couples
However, an approach limited to giving same-sex
couples the same legal status as common law couples is
not likely to provide an enduring solution. It is a
formulaic, "find and replace" approach to law reform
that assumes there is a principled basis to current
differences in the legal status of married and unmarried
heterosexual couples when, in fact, this may not be the
case. A number of laws, typically those dealing with
property rights, continue to extend rights and
responsibilities only to married couples. This is true of
all provincial legislation dealing with the division of
family property, of most provincial laws providing a
right to exclusive possession of the family home, and of
provincial laws dealing with intestate succession. It is
true that the Court in M v. H was not dealing directly
with marriage, nor with the legal rights extended
exclusively to married couples. Yet, the combination of
the Court's rulings in M v. H and Miron v. Trude1
33
means that the constitutionality of any distinctive legal
status for married spouses must be demonstrably
justified by governments. The majority in Miron held
that legislation limiting automobile insurance benefits to
married spouses was discriminatory because marital
status was not a reasonable way of identifying persons in
an economically interdependent relationship with
insured persons. Unmarried heterosexual couples had to
be included in the legislation. If Miron leans strongly
towards merging the legal status of married and common
law couples, and Mv. H does the same for common law
couples and same-sex couples, then the end result is
momentum towards conferring the entire package of
marital rights and responsibilities on same-sex couples.
(iv) The Definition of Marriage
M v. H also strengthens the argument that the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the common law
definition of marriage violates the human dignity of gay
' By virtue of theAdoptionAct, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 5, s. 29(l), the
Family Relations Amendment Act, S.B.C. 1997, c. 20 and the
Family Maintenance Enforcement Amendment Act, S.B.C.
1997, c. 19, same-sex couples now have the right to apply to
adopt a child, and the same rights as common law couples in
relation to spousal support, child support, and custody and
access issues.
32 A copy of the Foundation's notice of application can be found
at <http://www.ffef.ca/>.
33 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 [hereinafter Miron].
men and lesbians.3 4 In the absence of any other means of
relationship recognition, the opposite sex definition of
marriage means that, unlike heterosexual couples, same-
sex couples are denied any legally effective means of
choosing to have their relationships recognized as
spousal by their communities and the government. In an
ineffectual response to the constitutional pall hanging
over the law of marriage, on June 8 the House of
Commons, by a vote of 216-55, approved a motion
brought by the Reform Party stating that "marriage is and
should remain the union of one man and one woman to
the exclusion of all others" and that Parliament "will
take all necessary steps" within its jurisdiction "to
preserve this definition of marriage in Canada."35 The
motion itself has no legal force. To protect the common
law definition of marriage from constitutional challenge
in the courts, Parliament would have to reproduce the
definition in legislation that included a notwithstanding
clause. The public pressure necessary to goad Parliament
into its first use of section 33 has not yet materialized.
To the contrary, an Angus Reid poll released the day
after Parliament debated the marriage motion indicated
that a majority of Canadians (53%) are in favour of gay
marriage."
(v) Domestic Partnership
One way that governments may be able to placate
the intense opposition of a minority of Canadians to gay
marriage is to leave the common law definition of
marriage intact and to put in place an alternative means
of permitting couples to choose to have their
relationships recognized by the state as spousal. If gay
and lesbian couples had access to a legal status such as
"domestic partner," legally equivalent to marriage in all
but name, then the section 15 Charter challenge to the
common law definition of marriage would likely founder
on the absence of legal disadvantage. Even conservative
governments and commentators have expressed support
recently for the enactment of domestic partnership
regimes. 7 For moral conservatives who believe they
have lost the battle over gay rights,3" domestic
34 In 1993, before the Supreme Court rulings in Egan, Vriend and
M v. H, a majority of an Ontario court dismissed a
constitutional claim by a gay couple seeking to marry. See
Layland v. Ontario (Minister of Consumer & Commercial
Relations) (1993), 14 O.R. (3d) 658 (Gen. Div.). A new
challenge, brought by Michael Hendricks and Ren6 Leboeuf,
is underway in Quebec.
3' House of Commons Debates (8 June 1999) at 16069; 15960.
Anne Mcllroy, "Most in poll want gay marriages legalized"
Globe and Mail (10 June 1999) A l.
3 See, for example, Rainer Knopff, "The Case for Domestic
Partnership Laws" Policy Options (June 1999) at 53.
3 See Link Byfield, "So where's the party?" Alberta Report (31
May 1999) at 4: "... the gay rights war is over. We have been
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partnership schemes, which could be open to any two
persons living together in an interdependent relationship,
offer a last-ditch means of avoiding legislation that
explicitly validates gay and lesbian relationships and also
of preserving the privileged legal status of marriage. As
is the case with European domestic partnership laws,39
conservatives no doubt would fight for the enactment of
a regime that confers a second-class spousal status on
partners, with less than the full package of rights
accorded to married persons.
In principle, there are good reasons to explore the
possibility of enacting domestic partnership regimes.
Domestic partnership would provide an alternative to,
not a displacement of, existing routes to spousal status.40
As the widespread availability of birth control, abortion
and reproductive technologies drives an increasingly
large wedge between the coupling of heterosexuality and
procreation, we are moving further away from limiting
spousal status to marital or conjugal relationships, and
more towards measuring spousal relationships by their
duration and functional qualities of economic and
emotional interdependence. In addition to its limitation
to conjugal relationships, ascribed spousal status, such as
the common law definition of spouse at issue in Mv. H,
has the further disadvantage of imposing legal rights and
responsibilities on cohabitants that may or may not
correspond to their own needs and expectations. A
domestic partnership regime that, like marriage, enables
any two persons living together to choose spousal status,
rather than having it imposed upon them, and permits
them to take on a full range of rights and responsibilities
equivalent to those available to married couples if they
so choose, has much to recommend it.
4'
CONCLUSION
The style ofjudicial reasoning in Mv. H reflects the
impact of the increasingly aggressive attacks directed by
some politicians and the media at the exercise ofjudicial
power required by the Charter. Caution was written all
over the decision. The narrow focus on the challenged
provision, the absence of lengthy discussions of the
surrounding legal and social context, the employment of
the language ofjudicial deference, and the avoidance of
the "reading in" remedy - all signal a Court treading
lightly in the face of the attacks on its legitimacy. But,
despite the caution, the Court to its credit did not back
down from fulfilling its basic democratic role of
protecting minority rights. As politely as it could, the
Court has sent a clear message to all legislatures:
opposite sex definitions of spouse are discriminatory. If
you don't change them, we'll have to do it for you, case
by case, definition by definition.LO
Brenda Cossman
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of
Toronto.
Bruce Ryder
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University.
defeated. There is nothing left to lose, all that remains amounts
to a mopping-up operation by the victors."
3 See the discussion in Lahey, supra note 4, at 326-30.
o See Bruce Ryder, "Becoming Spouses: The Rights of Lesbian
and Gay Couples" in Law Society of Upper Canada Special
Lectures, Family Law: Roles, Fairness and Equality (Toronto:
Carswell, 1994) 399 at 430-50.
41 See Cossman and Ryder, supra note 30 at 154-56; Ontario Law
Reform Commission, Report on the Rights and
Responsibilities of Cohabitants Under the Family Law Act
(Toronto: OLRC, 1993) at 53-56.
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